

# Template Attacks in Principal Subspaces

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
# Outline

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- Principle of template attacks
- Open issues in template attacks
- PCA in high dimensional space
- PSTA
- Results on RC4
- Results on AES
- Conclusions



# Representation of side-channel information: univariate vs. multivariate approach



⇒ Most powerful adversary:


1. Take all **relevant** samples
2. and build a **multivariate** statistical model



# Example: template attacks

[Chari *et al.*, 2002]

- $K$  power traces



- Multivariate Gaussian noise model

$$P(t|s_k) = \mathcal{N}(t|m, S) = \frac{1}{(2\pi)^{N/2}|S|^{1/2}} \exp\left\{-\frac{1}{2}(t - m)^\top S^{-1}(t - m)\right\}$$


- Attack on new device

$$\hat{s}_k = \underset{s_k}{\operatorname{argmax}} P(t_{\text{new}}|s_k)P(s_k)$$




# Profiling phase

Any leakage:  
power,  
electromagnetic...



# Attack phase



$$\hat{s}_k = \underset{s_k}{\operatorname{argmax}} \mathbf{P}(s_k | \text{Observations})$$

Challenge: break a cipher using 1 single trace!

# Open issues

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## 1. How to select the relevant samples?

- Look for the largest differences between the mean traces. [Chari et al. 2002, Rechberger et al. 2004]
- Look for the largest cumulative differences.
- Look for the samples with maximal variance.

## 2. How to select window size?

- Clock cycle?

## 3. How many samples are needed to attack?



# A trace $\sim 10^5$ samples

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- Prohibitive memory usage!
- Automated way to reduce trace's size?

## Hypothesis:


**Information relies on amplitude of leakage signal (e.g. HW, HD models)**

- ➔ Focus on instants where signal variability is maximal!
- ➔ 1 candidate: Principal Component Analysis





# Principal Component Analysis



1. Rotate axes.
2. Discard irrelevant dimensions.

**Find subspace that preserves maximal data variance!**



# Ordinary PCA

- Rotation matrix

- Compute sample mean and covariance matrix

$$m = \frac{1}{K} \sum_{k=1}^K t_k$$

- Diagonalize sample covariance matrix (by eigendecomposition)

$$S = \frac{1}{K} \sum_{k=1}^K (t_k - m)(t_k - m)^T$$

$$SV = V\Lambda$$


$$\text{where } V^T V = I_K$$

- Keep  $M$  eigenvectors corresponding to  $M$  largest eigenvalues

Principal directions  
Variance in each direction



# PCA in high dimensional data



- Practical limitations of PCA:
  - The complexity of an eigendecomposition is  $O(N^3)$
  - $K \ll N$
- How to find the  $K-1$  first principal directions?
  - Eigendecomposition  $\left(\frac{1}{K}T_c^T T_c\right)U = U\Lambda \quad T_c \in \mathcal{R}^{K \times N}$
  - Covariance matrix  $\left(\frac{1}{K}T_c T_c^T\right)$
  - Left-multiplying by  $T_c$  gives  $S(T_c U) = (T_c U)\Lambda$
  - Eigenvectors normalized  $V = \frac{1}{K}(T_c U)\Lambda^{1/2}$



# Principal Subspace Template Attacks

- Keep principal directions:  $M$  eigenvectors

$$\mathbf{V}_{1:M} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{K}} (\mathbf{T}_c \mathbf{U}_{1:M}) \mathbf{\Lambda}_{1:M}^{1/2}$$

- Parameters of multivariate Gaussian noise model:

$$\mathbf{P}(\mathbf{V}_{1:M}^T \mathbf{t} | s_k) = \mathcal{N}(\mathbf{V}_{1:M}^T \mathbf{t} | \boldsymbol{\mu}_k, \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_k)$$

$$\text{where } \boldsymbol{\mu}_k = \mathbf{V}_{1:M}^T \mathbf{m}_k$$
$$\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_k = \mathbf{V}_{1:M}^T \mathbf{S}_k \mathbf{V}_{1:M}$$


- Attack in subspace:

$$\hat{s}_k = \underset{s_k}{\operatorname{argmax}} \mathbf{P}(\mathbf{V}_{1:M}^T \mathbf{t}_{\text{new}} | s_k) \mathbf{P}(s_k)$$



# Results on RC4: ATmega88



M eigenvalues?




Information summarized in principal directions




# Linear transformation in each direction = weighted sum



# Classification of 10 keys



1st and 2nd directions




2nd and 3rd directions

**Classification rate: 99 % with 3 components**


# Results on AES Rijndael

- FPGA implementation on Spartan II






# Each key candidate = $\neq$ paths




$$s_k = '000...0'$$



# More directions needed



# Classification rate



**20 components and 128 encrypted messages:  
86.7% on average  
(vs. Previous attack's results: 500 → 2000 encr. mess.)**



# Conclusions

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- PCA-based TA → principled approach for TA
- Relevant info → in a very few features (compression) automatically selected
- Maximal variance criterion → Starting hypothesis
- Successfully applied to RC4 and AES
- Future work:
  - Optimal number of components and encrypted messages in case of the AES?
  - Behavior when noise process is important (or non-Gaussian)?



# Questions?

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# How many principal directions?

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